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Abstract 
This paper analyzes the tax effects of the German real estate transfer tax (RETT). 
While the vast majority of single-family houses in Germany are owner-occupied, 
apartments are usually held by private and incorporated investors. For this reason, 
we conducted a regression analysis to determine the effects of increasing RETT on 
the number and the prices of transactions separately for these two market segments. 
Our findings suggest that increasing the RETT by 1% is associated with a decline 
in transactions by 0.23% for single-family houses, but with no significant effect on 
the prices of traded houses. Conversely, for apartments, we find no significantly 
negative effects on the transactions, but the price effect of the RETT tends to be 
negative. Finally, for vacant lots, we find even larger quantity effects than for single-
family houses suggesting roughly an elasticity of -1. The results for this specific 
market segment indicate that the government operates near the top of a Laffer 
curve.  
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1 Introduction 
While taxes on the transfers of housing properties are pervasive 
around the world, until recently, the economic effects of these taxes 
have received only limited attention from economists (Dachis et al., 
2011).1 However, real estate transfer taxes (RETTs) have obvious 
negative effects on the efficiency of the housing market such as 
reducing the number of mutually beneficial transactions. As the tax 
can be avoided by not selling a presently owned property and buying 
a different house, the tax is expected to lead to a fall in transactions, 
a reduction of mobility of homeowners, and may bias homeownership 
away from frequent movers towards infrequent movers (O’Sullivan et 
al., 1995). Even for immobile owners, the tax may lock-in owners into 
dwellings that do not suit their preferences. For example, the tax may 
prevent older couples and singles, who have a reduced demand for 
space, from making their houses available to large families.2    
Moreover, a RETT not only affects transactions concerning owner-
occupied housings. In several countries, including Germany, the tax 
will also fall on changes in ownership of property that is rented out 
and held as a capital investment. In this case, the tax will not reduce 
the mobility of the respective dwellers, i.e. the tenants. Indeed, 
frequent movers may actually self-select into the rental market to 
avoid transfer taxes. Instead, the transfer tax in this situation may 
be considered as a specific financial transaction tax that reduces the 
fungibility of the asset, but not worker mobility. Empirically, the 
average holding period of apartments, which are usually rented-out, 
at least in Germany, is shorter than the holding period of houses that 
are usually owner-occupied.3 Hence, the asset fungibility problem 
should therefore be more salient in the case of apartments. As a result, 
if fungibility is more highly valued in the case of apartments than in 
                                 
1 For an overview of land transfer taxes in the EU, see European Commission (2015, 
chap. 3.2).  
2 According to survey evidence provided by Sánchez and Andrews (2011, p. 15), 
family and housing related motives are behind most cases of residential mobility in 
many developed countries.  
3 For the different ratios of transactions and the stock of houses and apartments 
see, e.g., Deutsche Bundesbank (2015).  
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the case of houses, then a high transfer tax rate should tend to reduce 
asset values of apartments more than for single-family houses.4  
Indeed, a major distinction between single-family houses and 
apartments is connected to ownership. While some 81% of the families 
that are living in owner-occupied housing own a single-family house, 
only 19% live in an apartment.5 At the same time, single-family houses 
account for less than a third of all German housing units. This 
suggests that, unlike single-family houses, the vast majority of 
apartments are held as a form of capital investment.6  
From the above discussion, one may expect that an increase in the 
RETT may lead to a fall in transactions and a reduction in prices, 
where the latter effect, because of higher turnover rates, may be more 
pronounced for apartments than for houses. As a further market 
segment, we consider sales of vacant lots that may either be used for 
apartments or single-family homes.  
In this paper, we will look for such price and quantity effects of the 
RETT in the German property market. Until 2006, there was a tax 
rate of 3.5% on the purchase price of German real estate 
(Grunderwerbsteuer) that was uniformly applied in all states 
(Bundesländer), although the revenues accrue to the state in which 
the transaction takes place. Since 2006, the RETT is no longer set at 
the federal level. Instead, each of the 16 German states is not only 
entitled to receive the tax revenue, but may decide on its own 
individual rate. The current level of the land transfer tax in Germany 
varies between 3.5% and 6.5%.  
Our panel data regressions exploit these state differences in order 
to examine the tax effects on state-wide indices of property 
transactions and transaction prices. Our findings can be summarized 
as follows. For single-family houses, we find that a one percent 
increase of the tax rate leads to a fall of some 0.23 percent in the 
                                 
4 In Germany, single-family houses are defined as property with just one housing 
unit, i.e., detached houses, semi-detached houses and terraced houses.  
5 Statista (2016); Based on a simulation model, Kaas et al. (2017) recently concluded 
that the RETT is partly responsible for the low German ratio of self-occupied 
housing.  
6 It should be noted that a RETT is also triggered by direct or indirect transfers of 
at least 95% of the interest in a partnership or of shares in a company owning real 
estate in Germany.6 The tax can be avoided if only 94.9% are sold to a single buyer 
or by having the shareholder either keep the remaining 5.1% or sell it to a second 
one not connected to the other shareholder. 
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number of transactions. At the same time, there is an insignificant 
effect on transaction prices. Conversely, for apartments, the effect of 
a tax increase is insignificant when it comes to the number of 
transactions, but there tends to be a negative effect when we look at 
transaction prices. These differences between types of tenure, to the 
best of our knowledge, have not received attention in the literature. 
They may reflect that, in contrast to single-family houses, apartments 
may be viewed as capital investments where an increase in the 
transaction tax leads to a loss of asset value due to reduced 
fungibility. What is more, we find the largest tax elasticity of 
transactions for vacant lots. For this market segment our result of a 
unit elasticity of sales suggests that the top of the Laffer curve is 
reached, where a tax increase does not raise additional tax revenues.  
The reminder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 
presents a literature review of recent papers on the economic effects 
of RETTs. Section 3 provides an introduction to the effect of 
transaction taxes on asset values. Section 4 contains our empirical 
results before Section 5 concludes.  
2 Literature Review 
While for a long time RETTs have been largely neglected, recently 
several papers examined the empirical effects in various countries.  
Some of the studies rely on panel data with different tax changes 
in different regions of a country. Dachis, Duranton and Turner (2008) 
analyze the impact of the introduction of a 1.1% land transfer tax in 
Toronto that did not apply in the surrounding region. They find that 
the introduction of the tax resulted in a 16% fall in housing sales and 
a 1.5% reduction in housing values. Davidoff and Leigh (2013) 
estimate that the Australian stamp tax on house sales lowers house 
prices with a tax elasticity around 0.26 and reduces housing turnover 
with an elasticity of 0.3.  
There is also a growing literature that uses tax notches, i.e. 
discontinuities in the tax schedule, for the identification of tax effects.7 
                                 
7 See Hilber and Lyytikainen (2013), Best and Kleven (2013), Kopczuk and Munroe 
(2015), Besley et al. (2014), Slemrod et al. (2016).  
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Most of these studies find significant effects of RETTs on the 
transaction volume in the market.      
Despite the fact that the German tax rates have now been 
regionally differentiated for ten years, there has been only limited 
research on the empirical effects of the German RETT. Fritzsche and 
Vandrei (2016) look at single-family house transactions in six of the 
sixteen German states. Their estimates suggest that a one-percentage-
point increase in the RETT reduces transactions by 6%. By using the 
average tax rate in their sample (4.17%), this semi-elasticity 
corresponds to an elasticity of -0.25. This magnitude is confirmed by 
our own results that are based on the full set of states.  In a recent 
discussion paper, Buettner (2017) looks at the tax rate elasticity of 
tax revenues and finds that across the German federal states a one 
percent tax increase leads to significantly less than a one percent 
increase in revenue, which is interpreted as evidence for behavioral 
effects and a sizable excess burden. 
While the present paper is certainly not the first paper that 
examines the behavioral effects of a RETT, to the best of our 
knowledge it is the first that distinguishes between prices and 
transactions for apartments and single-family houses and additionally 
presents results for sales of vacant lots. Moreover, the paper also uses 
a new data source that has not previously been employed to study 
tax effects.  
The distinction between apartments and single-family houses is 
potentially very important, at least for the German housing market. 
As highlighted above, the rate of self-occupancy is much different for 
single-family houses and apartments. While transaction taxes, 
therefore, may reduce labor mobility or increase commuting when 
applied to single-family homes, the main effect for apartments may 
be a reduced asset fungibility. Thus, the next section provides a short 
introduction into the relevant theory of transaction taxes.  
3 Transaction Taxes and Asset Values 
Transaction taxes are not only prominent when it comes to property 
sales. They have recently also received large attention in connection 
to the plans for a EU-wide financial transaction tax. The literature 
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on financial transaction costs argues that such costs may not only 
reduce the number of trades, but also asset prices.8 Clearly, 
transaction taxes are part of the transaction costs. The insight that a 
transaction tax can be expected to decrease asset values, however, is 
not restricted to financial assets but extends to real assets that are 
subject to a transaction tax in the case of an ownership change.9   
Following Matheson (2011, 2012), assume that an asset produces 
a real cash flow, say a net rental income, of 𝐶𝐹𝑡 at time 𝑡, that for 
simplicity may be assumed to grow at an exogenous rate 𝑔 and is 
discounted at an exogenous interest rate 𝑟 > 𝑔. Each time the asset 
changes owner, an ad valorem tax at rate 𝑇 has to be paid on the 
transaction. If the holding period of each owner of the asset is 
constant and denoted by 𝑁, then the tax inclusive price at time 0 that 
a purchaser may pay the incumbent owner can be written as    
𝑉(0) = ∫ 𝐶𝐹𝑡
𝑁
0
∙ 𝑒−(𝑟−𝑔)𝑡𝑑𝑡 + (1 − 𝑇)𝑒−𝑟𝑁𝑉(𝑁).  (1) 
In such a simple framework, it can be shown (Matheson, 2011, p. 
39-41) that the proportional reduction of the tax inclusive purchase 
price can be expressed as  
Δ(𝑇) =
𝑇𝑒−(𝑟−𝑔)𝑁
1−(1−𝑇)𝑒−(𝑟−𝑔)𝑁
 .  (2) 
Table 1 illustrates this result for 𝑟 − 𝑔 = 1% and different holding 
periods 𝑁. Clearly, the shorter the holding period, the larger the 
negative impact of a given tax rate on the transaction price. We will 
come back to this insight in the empirical section below.  
Another observation that may be highlighted is that the price fall 
described by equation (2) is triggered even with a constant holding 
period 𝑁. This in turn implies that a price decrease may not 
necessarily require a reduction in transaction volume, which would be 
reflected in longer holding periods.  
 
 
                                 
8 See Amihud and Mendelson (1986).  
9 A distinct issue is that in both markets (housing, financial assets) there is the 
question whether a transaction tax can reduce market bubbles. We do not embark 
on this question here. 
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Table 1. The Interplay of Holding Period and Proportional Reduction 
of Asset Value  
     
Holding Period (years) 5 10 30 100 
Tax rate 3%     
Δ(3%)  36.9% 22.2% 7.9% 1.7% 
Tax rate 6%     
Δ(6%)  53.9% 36.3% 14.6% 3.4% 
Note: Based on equation (2) and 𝑟 − 𝑔 = 0.01. For a similar table adapted to holding 
periods and tax rates of financial securities cf. Matheson (2012).  
 
Several authors have been surprised by their large estimated tax 
effects, which sometimes suggest that a one euro increase in the land 
transfer tax leads to a more than a one euro drop in house transaction 
prices (see, e.g., Davidoff and Leigh, 2013, p. 403; Kopczuk and 
Munroe 2015; Ihlanfeldt and Shaugnessy, 2004). The tax 
capitalization effects illustrated in Table 1 are a potential explanation 
for these findings. As a once and for all tax increase will affect all 
future transactions, capitalization effects may well exceed the tax due 
on a single transaction today, in particular, if the average holding 
period of real estate is short.   
4 Empirical Results 
In this section, we use the panel variation of RETT rates across 
German states to evaluate their impact separately on transactions 
and prices in different segments of the property market. Table 2 
illustrates the development after the decentralization of the tax rate 
decision, following a constitutional change enacted in 2006.10 Since 
then, only two states (Bavaria and Saxony) have kept the initial rate 
of 3.5%. All other states have raised the tax rate at least once. The 
tax rate is applied on the transaction value as fixed in the contract 
drawn up before a notary. Formally, the buyer of the property is 
required to pay the tax and the change of ownership is pending until 
the tax payment has been received. While the decision on tax rates 
has been decentralized, all states have to follow the same definition 
of the tax base.  
                                 
10 Gesetz zur Änderung des Grundgesetzes, 28 August 2006 (BGBl. I 2006, p. 2034). 
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Table 2. German RETT Rates in Percent of Purchase Price  
 Year 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 
Baden-Wurttemberg 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Bavaria 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Berlin 3.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.0 5.0 6.0 6.0 
Brandenburg 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Bremen 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.0 5.0 
Hamburg 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 
Hesse 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 5.0 6.0 6.0 
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Lower Saxony 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 4.5 5.0 5.0 
North Rhine-Westphalia 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 6.5 
Rhineland-Palatinate 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Saarland 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 5.5 5.5 6.5 
Saxony 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 
Saxony-Anhalt 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 4.5 4.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Schleswig-Holstein 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 5.0 5.0 6.5 6.5 
Thuringia 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 3.5 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 5.0 
Average Tax Rate 3.5 3.5 3.6 3.6 3.6 3.7 4.2 4.6 4.8 5.0 5.3 
 Note: Tax rates are shown as applicable in January of the respective year.  
 
4.1 Price and Quantity Effects 
 
In the following, we make use of indices of property transactions and 
average purchase prices that have been generated at the state level. 
For single-family houses and apartments, the data on the real estate 
transactions for the period between 2003 and 2014 for all 16 federal 
states in Germany is proprietary data that has been provided by 
GEWOS GmbH, Hamburg. For vacant lots, there is data from the 
German Statistical Office. Transactions are divided into three groups: 
single-family homes, apartments, and vacant lots.11 For the first two 
groups, the base year, 2003 has an index of 100 in all states. The 
number of property transactions in the following years has been 
compared to this base year and adjusted accordingly. In the case of 
vacant lots, we use data on the area sold. For the estimation of the 
price effects, we operate with the average purchase prices (given in 
€1.000) of single-family homes and apartments for the period between 
2003 and 2014 as provided by Statista. Data by the German 
                                 
11 In German: Einfamilienhäuser, Eigentumswohnungen and Bauland.  
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Statistical Office on the average price per square meter (on the state-
year level) is taken for vacant lots.  
Using the transaction numbers, we exploit a panel data structure. 
Table 3 in panels A, B, and C presents the results that are separately 
calculated for single-family homes, apartments and vacant lots. We 
rely on a log-log specification where the coefficient of the tax rate 
variable, Ln(Tax rate), can be interpreted as the elasticity of 
transaction numbers (traded square meters in the case of vacant lots) 
with respect to a change in the tax rate. Column (1) starts with a 
parsimonious model for single-family houses that contains state fixed 
effects, density dependent time fixed effects (as explained below), and 
the log of the tax rate. For selected years, in which the tax rate was 
changed within a calendar year, we are using the average rate with 
the length of the respective rate applicability as the weighting factors. 
A possible problem that could arise is that tax changes are anticipated 
and may lead to transactions being pulled forward in time to avoid 
tax increases. Such effects may blow up the tax base in a year 
preceding a tax increase and lower it in the year of the increase. For 
this reason, we designed two variables that are designed to pick up 
possible time shifts. D(Year before tax increase) is constructed with 
the help of a dummy that indicates state-years that precede a tax 
increase in January of the next year. The relevant dummy has been 
multiplied with the tax increase. Likewise, D(Year of tax increase) 
marks state-years with a tax increase in January and is also scaled by 
the tax increase.  
 Several tax increases did not take place at the start of the year, 
but at some point during the year. In this case, the average tax rate 
may exaggerate the effective tax if tax payers shift transactions into 
the more lowly taxed part of the same year. For this reason, we 
construct a variable D(Within year increase) that measures the size 
of the increase in state-years with a tax change between February and 
November of the calendar year and is zero in other years.12  
                                 
12 Since empirical evidence with selected micro data (Fritzsche and Vandrei, 2016) 
suggests that anticipation effects in Germany are short-lived and seem to be 
restricted to a time window of approximately two months before and after the tax 
hike, we decided to encode Di,t-1(Year before tax increase) = D i,t(Year of tax 
increase) = 0 in the case of a tax increase in the middle of year t.  
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 While all estimations of Table 3 allow for time-fixed effects, there 
is the possibility that time-trends for the property market are 
different for urban and more rural states. Therefore, we additionally 
allow time-fixed effects to differ between two groups of states.13  
 
Table 3. Elasticity of Transactions  
Panel A. Single-family Houses 
 
 
(1) FE, 
OLS 
(2) FE, 
OLS 
(3) FE, 
OLS 
(4) FE,  
OLS 
(5) FE, 
OLS 
(6) FE, 
Poisson 
Ln(Tax rate) -0.231 -0.211 -0.219 -0.186 -0.26 -0.259 
 [0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.002]*** [0.011]** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
D(Year before  3.766  3.627 2.088 2.36 
tax increase)  [0.036]**  [0.051]* [0.306] [0.071]* 
D(Year of tax  0.393  -0.066 -0.425 -0.659 
increase)  [0.846]  [0.975] [0.792] [0.617] 
D(Within year  2.39  2.427 2.024 2.04 
increase)  [0.200]  [0.187] [0.212] [0.078]* 
Ln(GDP)   -0.139 -0.073 0.061 0.033 
   [0.676] [0.827] [0.835] [0.945] 
Ln(l.Debt)   0.013 0.007 0.003 0.003 
   [0.532] [0.738] [0.886] [0.858] 
Ln(Population)   -0.185 -0.091 0.54 0.478 
   [0.684] [0.842] [0.203] [0.455] 
Ln(UE)   -0.108 -0.099 0.108 0.096 
    [0.357] [0.400] [0.341] [0.522] 
Observations 192 192 185 185 185 185 
State fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Density dep. 
year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City-state year 
fixed effects NO NO NO NO Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.73 0.739 0.748 0.757 0.814 -- 
States   16 16 16 16 16 16 
 
  
                                 
13 Based on a threshold of 70% of space with sparse population according to the 
German Statistical Office, we classified six states as “rural“ (Bavaria, Brandenburg, 
Rhineland-Palatinate, Saxony-Anhalt, Schleswig-Holstein and Thuringia).  
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Panel B. Apartments 
 
(1) FE, 
OLS 
(2) FE, 
OLS 
(3) FE, 
OLS 
(4) FE,  
OLS 
(5) FE, 
OLS 
(6) FE, 
Poisson 
Ln(Tax rate) 0.064 0.178 0.115 0.271 0.204 0.208 
 [0.584] [0.160] [0.362] [0.027]** [0.104] [0.079]* 
D(Year before  8.958  10.312 10.511 11.041 
tax increase)  [0.002]***  [0.001]*** [0.001]*** [0.001]*** 
D(Year of tax  -2.904  -3.385 -1.542 -1.783 
increase)  [0.395]  [0.322] [0.654] [0.574] 
D(Within year  3.505  3.712 4.886 5.419 
increase)  [0.215]  [0.149] [0.036]** [0.017]** 
Ln(GDP)   0.608 0.776 0.671 0.711 
   [0.305] [0.152] [0.134] [0.105] 
Ln(l.Debt)   0.015 -0.003 -0.03 -0.022 
   [0.805] [0.959] [0.482] [0.452] 
Ln(Population)   0.42 0.635 -0.355 -0.541 
   [0.606] [0.428] [0.677] [0.550] 
Ln(UE)   -0.205 -0.193 -0.432 -0.445 
    [0.287] [0.299] [0.044]** [0.033]** 
Observations 192 192 185 185 185 185 
State fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Density dep. 
year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City-state year 
fixed effects NO NO NO NO Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.809 0.822 0.827 0.844 0.865 -- 
States  16 16 16 16 16 16 
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Panel C. Vacant Lots 
 
(1) FE, 
OLS 
(2) FE, 
OLS 
(3) FE, 
OLS 
(4) FE,  
OLS 
(5) FE, 
OLS 
(6) FE, 
Poisson 
Ln(Tax rate) -0.955 -1.061 -0.856 -0.931 -1.032 -1.211 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.004]*** [0.002]*** [0.001]*** [0.064]* 
D(Year before  7.935  9.154 3.436 -2.973 
tax increase)  [0.302]  [0.235] [0.647] [0.836] 
D(Year of tax  7.09  6.828 2.637 5.564 
increase)  [0.531]  [0.542] [0.811] [0.872] 
D(Within year  19.184  20.108 18.09 13.531 
increase)  [0.031]**  [0.020]** [0.047]** [0.926] 
Ln(GDP)   -2.233 -2.215 -2.933 -5.552 
   [0.156] [0.155] [0.086]* [0.127] 
Ln(l.Debt)   -0.091 -0.113 -0.142 -0.157 
   [0.218] [0.123] [0.069]* [0.068]* 
Ln(Population)   -0.042 0.138 1.241 -1.196 
   [0.981] [0.938] [0.544] [0.673] 
Ln(UE)   -0.351 -0.325 0.242 0.127 
    [0.395] [0.423] [0.610] [0.847] 
Observations 184 184 177 177 177 177 
State fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Density dep. 
year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City-state year 
fixed effects NO NO NO NO Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.951 0.953 0.953 0.955 0.96 . 
States  16 16 16 16 16 16 
Note: Endogenous variable: log of index of housing transactions (2003-2014) in Panels A 
and B, log of traded square meters in Panel C. Robust p-values in brackets. ***, ** and * 
denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence level. D(Year before tax increase) 
is the product of a dummy that indicates state-years that precede a tax increase in January 
of the next year and the size of the tax increase. D(Year of tax increase) marks state-years 
with a tax increase in January and is also scaled by the tax increase. D(Within year 
increase) is zero in state year without a tax change between February and November of the 
calendar year, but reflects the size of the tax increase otherwise. LnGDP, Ln(l.Debt), 
Ln(Population), and Ln(UE) represent the log of GDP, the log of the lagged debt level, the 
log of the population and the log of unemployed for the respective state.  
 
According to the results from the parsimonious model presented in 
Column (1) of Panel A, the number of transactions goes down by 
0.23% if the tax rate is increased by 1%. Column (2), (4), (5) and (6), 
which add variables that may capture anticipation effects, yield 
comparable magnitudes. Of these additional variables, only D(Year 
before tax increase), which captures additional transactions in the 
year preceding a tax increase, is significant in most of our equations 
in Panel A. Columns (3) to (6) include essential macro variables like 
the log of GDP, the log of unemployed, and the log of state population 
that, however, are not statistically significant.  
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A possible variable that may drive both the tax base of the RETT 
and the decision to enact a tax increase is the debt level of the state. 
The debt level may decrease property values and may, as a result, 
influence purchases through the expectations of future tax increases 
and the respective tax capitalization. At the same time, it is the case 
that especially the particularly high indebted states have increased 
the tax rate, while the two most prudent low-debt states Saxony and 
Bavaria have been the only states that have kept the initial tax rate 
of 3.5%. Ignorance of the debt level could potentially lead to an 
omitted variables bias, as the debt level could both influence the 
decision to enact tax increases and the attractiveness of the property 
market. However, the introduction of the log of last year’s debt level, 
Ln(l.Debt), does not yield a significant coefficient. Presumably, the 
mere state-fixed effects are enough to pick up debt differences across 
states and reduce the significance of state specific macro variables.  
Columns (5) and (6) use the same right-hand variables, but, as a 
further robustness test, add specific time fixed effects for the three 
city-states (Berlin, Bremen and Hamburg), as for those, the 
development of the housing market may differ beyond what the simple 
density-dependent time effects can pick up.  
In the case of the regressions for single-family houses, a Breusch-
Pagan/Cook-Weisberg test does usually not reject the null that errors 
are homoscedastic; however our log-log specification may lead to a 
bias if errors indeed are heteroscedastic.14 For this reason, Column (6) 
presents the results from a fixed-effects Poisson estimator with robust 
standard errors (Wooldridge 1999). Here, the transaction index has 
been introduced without taking the log, but the coefficient of the tax 
rate again can be interpreted as an elasticity. The results confirm the 
magnitude of the coefficients found in the simple OLS fixed effects 
estimates and the rounded point estimates of the OLS in Column (5) 
and the Poisson estimate in (6) are both -0.26 and very close to those 
in the parsimonious regression.  
The results for apartments in Panel B of Table 3 are quite different 
from those for single-family houses. The elasticity here tends to be 
positive, but insignificant with the exception of Column (4) and 
                                 
14 See Santos Silva and Tenreyro (2006). 
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Column (6) where the coefficient is significant at the ten percent level. 
Note that in Columns (3) to (6), the macroeconomic variables, 
Ln(GDP), Ln(l.Debt), Ln(UE) and Ln(Population), with only two 
exceptions for Ln(UE), are neither individually nor jointly significant, 
which indicates no advantage over the more parsimonious models (1) 
and (2).15 On the other hand, the rejection of homoscedasticity for 
Columns (1) to (5) may suggest using (6) as the preferred 
specification, although the similarity of coefficients for Ln(Tax rate) 
in columns (5) and (6) is striking and does not indicate a bias of the 
OLS estimate.  
Panel C of Table 3 presents the results of the quantity effects for 
vacant land. The coefficients for our main variable of interest, Ln(Tax 
rate), are highly significant in all specifications and close to -1 
(ranging from -0.86 to -1.21). Apart from the main tax variable, few 
other variables are significant. An exception is the variable D(Within 
year increase), which indicates a larger transaction volume in years 
in which the rate is changed. When interpreting the coefficient of 
D(Within year increase), note that the average value of the variable, 
for years in which a within year change happens, is 0.012. Therefore, 
a coefficient of 20.1 translates into a moderate elasticity of 0.24. 
Furthermore, the level of state government debt enters negatively, 
but is significant only in columns (5) and (6).  
Summary statistics for these and following regressions are presented 
in Table 4. For clarity, some variables that have been used in log form 
in the regressions are reported without logs in this summary table.  
                                 
15 The insignificance of state GDP may be due to its limited quality. See Burret, 
Feld and Köhler (2017).  
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Table 4. Summary Statistics  
 Obs Mean Std.Dev. Min Max 
Tax rate (weighted) 
192 0.0389193 0.0065053 0.035 0.065 
GDP (in €1.000) 
192 158020.5 159801 24382 624668 
l.Debt  
186 9648.871 5527.313 1845.8 31298.5 
UN 
192 226573.6 190366.7 34282 1057649 
Population 
192 5106126 4685176 652182 18100000 
Price houses (in € 1.000) 
192 157.7307 71.95047 59.8 420.4 
Price apartments (in 
€ 1.000)  
192 121.2214 37.87135 55.4 295.5 
Transaction index houses 192 96.86458 11.1549 67 142 
Transaction index 
apartments   192 
        
113.7344 28.60358 76 237 
Traded vacant lots (m2) 185 7003.951 6708.829 251 28599 
Price vacant lots (per m²) 190 106.0829 106.6987 17.05 548.31 
D(Year before tax 
increase) 192 0.0008594 0.0030981 0 0.015 
D(Year of tax increase)  192 0.0007292 0.0028468 0 0.015 
D(Within year increase) 192 0.0005496 0.0026265 0 0.015 
 
Although our regressions include density dependent year fixed 
effects, a possible remaining concern may be that the time trend for 
states that did or did not increase their tax rates may differ 
systematically. To further investigate the causal effect of tax rate 
changes on the transactions of houses and vacant lots, we look at 
whether the reaction of transaction volumes is closely connected to 
the year of the relevant tax increases.16 Six new variables are 
generated for this purpose. r_change-3, r_change-2 and r_change-1 
take on the value of any tax rate change that happens three, two and 
one years later. r_change+1 equals the tax rate change one year after 
the reform; in all consecutive years the variable r_change+2f is used 
as the lag variable. Finally, r_change measures the tax increase in the 
year of the increase itself.  
Figure 1 presents coefficient plots of these variables for the case of 
the transactions of single-family homes and vacant lots. Panels A and 
B of Figure 1 support a causal tax effect on transactions. In both 
cases, the coefficients of the lead variables are insignificant and only 
                                 
16 For a similar approach see Autor (2003).  
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become (at least weakly) significant in the year of the tax increase 
and thereafter.17  
 
Figure 1. Coefficient Plots 
Panel A. Single-family Houses 
   
Panel B. Vacant Lots 
   
Note: The coefficient plots show the point estimates and 95% confidence intervals. In Panel 
A the plot results from a regression of the log of the index of single-family home transactions 
on the lead and lag variables shown, plus simple year fixed effects, state fixed effects, LnGDP, 
Ln(l.Debt), Ln(Population), and Ln(UE). In Panel B the right hand side variables are the 
same, but the left hand variable is the log of the transactions of square meters of vacant lots. 
Note that the lead and lag variables are not constructed by using the log of the tax rate, but 
by taking the simple size of the rate changes. Therefore the plotted coefficients, unlike in 
Table 3, cannot be interpreted as elasticities.  
 
The results in Table 3 (backed up by Figure 1, Panel A) suggest 
that the RETT increases in German states have reduced transactions 
                                 
17 We omit the presentation of a coefficient plot for apartments as for this market 
segment the regressions showed an insignificant result. 
r_change-3
r_change-2
r_change-1
r_change
r_change+1
r_change+2f
-15 -10 -5 0 5
r_change-3
r_change-2
r_change-1
r_change
r_change+1
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-100 -50 0 50
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of single-family homes, but not of apartments. Keeping in mind that 
most houses are owner-occupied, while apartments are not, the 
difference in the result has an interesting implication. It means that 
the RETT has an effect on German housing transactions in that 
market segment, where the mobility of dwellers may indeed be 
reduced, i.e., in the segment of owner-occupied family houses. 
Conversely, for apartments, where labor mobility for the huge 
majority of tenants would not be reduced by a reduction of ownership 
transactions, we find no negative impact of the tax on ownership 
changes.  
In a next step, we consider the price component of transactions for 
houses, apartments and vacant lots. This information is provided at 
the state-year level online by the German Statistical Office 
(www.destatis.de). Table 5 collects the relevant results. Again, in each 
of the three panels, Column (1) starts with a parsimonious OLS model 
containing state fixed effects, density dependent time fixed effects, 
and the log of the tax rate.18 The following three model specifications 
capture anticipation effects and the local macroeconomic conditions. 
In the case of single-family houses, no impact of the RETT can be 
observed. The insignificance of the tax rate prevails if city-state time 
effects are added in Column (5) and when the estimation is done via 
a fixed effects Poisson model in Column (6).  
As there is no evidence for a significant price effect, this suggests 
that in the case of single-family houses, the incidence of the tax is 
with purchasers. Conversely, the RETT tends to have a uniformly 
negative effect on the prices of apartments that is significant at the 
five percent level according to the first four models in Panel B. This 
is compatible with the expectation of a capitalization of the tax in 
the price of the property, as discussed in Section 3. Indeed, we get a 
negative price effect of the tax in all models (1) to (6), although the 
coefficient is not significantly negative once we add city-state time 
effects as done in (5) and (6). However, note that inclusion of density 
dependent time effects and city-state time effects tends to make it 
more difficult to identify tax effects, as this inclusion of dummies 
                                 
18 Note that using seemingly unrelated regressions (SUR) to estimate transactions 
and prices would not improve the efficiency of our estimations, as all regressions 
are using the same set of regressors.  
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(although jointly significant) reduces the effective control group for 
tax increasing states.  
The point estimates of the elasticity of the (net-of-tax) price of 
apartments with respect to the tax rate (𝜀) in Table 5 lie 
between -0.079 and -0.166. If taken seriously, what would these 
estimates imply for the incidence of the tax? Note that a one percent 
increase of the tax rate ceteris paribus increases the tax inclusive price 
depending on the tax rate: at a constant net-of-tax price, increasing 
the tax rate from 3.9% (the sample average) by 1% increases the price 
by 0.039% (= 3.9% ∙ 1%). However, based on our point estimates for 
apartments, 𝜀, the reduction of the pre-tax price overcompensated 
this price increase. This suggests that more than 100% of the 
incidence is with the sellers.  As the discussion in Section 3 has 
indicated, such a result is not only suggested by our point estimates. 
It has also been derived in studies for house markets in other countries 
and may be related to the character of the tax as a financial 
transaction tax. As the discussion in Section 3 has also indicated, a 
tax induced price decrease is even possible if the average holding 
period and the level of transactions are unchanged. For apartments, 
the latter is suggested by the insignificant results in Table 3.  
Turning to Panel C, we find that the tax coefficient of interest in 
the case of vacant lots is insignificant, indicating no tax capitalization 
effect for this segment of the property market. Conversely, as in the 
cases of houses and apartments,  there is consistent evidence of a price 
dampening effect of state public debt.  
Table 5. Price Reactions  
Panel A. Single-family Houses 
 
(1) FE, 
OLS 
(2) FE, 
OLS 
(3) FE, 
OLS 
(4) FE,  
OLS 
(5) FE, 
OLS 
(6) FE, 
Poisson 
Ln(Tax rate) -0.038 -0.047 0.004 0.008 0.018 0.035 
 [0.413] [0.386] [0.938] [0.888] [0.739] [0.579] 
D(Year before  -1.608  -0.279 0.618 -0.05 
tax increase)  [0.198]  [0.828] [0.550] [0.971] 
D(Year of tax  -0.093  -0.288 0.638 -0.021 
increase)  [0.960]  [0.859] [0.677] [0.986] 
D(Within year  -1.36  -0.966 -0.233 -1.069 
increase)  [0.451]  [0.584] [0.903] [0.378] 
Ln(GDP)   0.408 0.403 0.285 0.177 
   [0.091]* [0.115] [0.145] [0.555] 
Ln(l.Debt)   -0.043 -0.042 -0.055 -0.049 
   [0.148] [0.160] [0.003]*** [0.045]** 
Ln(Population)   1.074 1.062 0.314 0.412 
   [0.002]*** [0.003]*** [0.289] [0.413] 
Ln(UE)   0.198 0.195 -0.007 -0.038 
    [0.030]** [0.033]** [0.937] [0.680] 
Observations 192 192 185 185 185 185 
State fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Density dep. 
year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City-state year 
fixed effects NO NO NO NO Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.991 0.991 0.993 . 
States   16 16 16 16 16 16 
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Panel B. Apartments 
 (1) FE, 
OLS 
(2) FE, 
OLS 
(3) FE, 
OLS 
(4) FE, 
OLS 
(5) FE, 
OLS 
(6) FE, 
Poisson 
Ln(Tax rate) -0.15 -0.166 -0.131 -0.139 -0.094 -0.079 
 [0.020]** [0.020]** [0.027]** [0.026]** [0.153] [0.173] 
D(Year before  -3.174  -2.117 -1.831 -1.649 
tax increase)  [0.031]**  [0.136] [0.152] [0.091]* 
D(Year of tax  -0.478  -0.6 -1.104 -1.169 
increase)  [0.839]  [0.773] [0.618] [0.580] 
D(Within year  -1.631  -1.146 -0.87 -0.959 
increase)  [0.415]  [0.490] [0.623] [0.395] 
Ln(GDP)   0.556 0.511 0.534 0.38 
   [0.014]** [0.028]** [0.024]** [0.188] 
Ln(l.Debt)   -0.055 -0.053 -0.078 -0.073 
   [0.045]** [0.063]* [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Ln(Population)   0.874 0.809 0.576 0.42 
   [0.039]** [0.058]* [0.177] [0.325] 
Ln(UE)   0.409 0.401 0.377 0.332 
    [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
Observations 192 192 185 185 185 185 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Density dep. year 
fixed effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City-state year 
fixed effects 
NO NO NO NO Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.96 0.961 0.967 0.967 0.971 -- 
States  16 16 16 16 16 16 
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Panel C. Vacant Lots 
 (1) FE, 
OLS 
(2) FE, 
OLS 
(3) FE, 
OLS 
(4) FE, 
OLS 
(5) FE, 
OLS 
(6) FE, 
Poisson 
Ln(Tax rate) -0.177 -0.119 -0.136 -0.072 0.002 0.125 
 [0.153] [0.378] [0.306] [0.636] [0.989] [0.235] 
D(Year before  -4.39  -4.03 -2.726 0.869 
tax increase)  [0.240]  [0.303] [0.418] [0.772] 
D(Year of tax  -4.803  -5.272 -5.922 -1.824 
increase)  [0.185]  [0.154] [0.131] [0.644] 
D(Within year  -5.538  -4.943 -4.753 -0.092 
increase)  [0.272]  [0.327] [0.391] [0.976] 
Ln(GDP)   -0.425 -0.438 -0.457 -0.667 
   [0.493] [0.480] [0.470] [0.358] 
Ln(l.Debt)   -0.1 -0.096 -0.102 -0.143 
   [0.067]* [0.093]* [0.118] [0.028]** 
Ln(Population)   -0.165 -0.27 -0.279 0.909 
   [0.885] [0.816] [0.815] [0.568] 
Ln(UE)   0.283 0.27 0.217 0.373 
    [0.304] [0.328] [0.455] [0.189] 
Observations 184 184 177 177 177 177 
State fixed effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Density dep. year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City-state year fixed 
effects 
NO NO NO NO Yes Yes 
R-squared 0.975 0.976 0.976 0.977 0.979 . 
States 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Note: Endogenous variable: log of average housing prices in Panel A, log of average apartment prices in 
Panel B, log of average price per square meter in Panel C (2003-2014). Robust p-values in brackets. ***, 
** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence level. D(Year before tax increase) is the 
product of a dummy that indicates state-years that precede a tax increase in January of the next year and 
the size of the tax increase. D(Year of tax increase) marks state-years with a tax increase in January and 
is also scaled by the tax increase. D(Within year increase) is zero in state year without a tax change 
between February and November of the calendar year, but reflects the size of the tax increase otherwise. 
LnGDP, Ln(l.Debt), Ln(Population), and Ln(UE) represent the log of GDP, the log of the lagged debt 
level, the log of the population and the log of unemployed for the respective state. 
 
While the results from Table 5 indicate no price effects of the RETT for vacant 
land and single-family homes, we receive consistently negative results (although 
not always highly significant) for apartments. To follow up on the effect for 
apartments, Figure 2 provides a coefficient plot analogous to the approach behind 
Figure 1, which dealt with quantity changes. We find that the coefficients are 
significantly decreased already from the year before the tax rate change, but not 
in the two previous years. This may indicate anticipation effects that would be 
consistent with the negative signs of D(Year before tax increase) in Panel B 
(although these are not significant in all models). Therefore, the coefficient plot 
may be still seen as a tentative confirmation that the price reductions indeed are 
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triggered by the tax rate changes. The alternative hypothesis that tax rate 
increases are triggered by a fall in the price for apartments seems to lack 
plausibility.   
  
Figure 2: Coefficient Plots: Apartments 
   
Note: The coefficient plot with 95% confidence intervals results from a regression of the log of the average 
prices of apartments on the lead and lag variables shown, plus simple year fixed effects, state fixed effects, 
LnGDP, Ln(l.Debt), Ln(Population), and Ln(UE). Note that the lead and lag variables are not constructed 
by using the log of the tax rate. Therefore the plotted coefficients, unlike in Table 5, cannot be interpreted 
as elasticities.  
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Table 6. Adding up Elasticity Estimates 
 
 Single-family Houses Apartments Vacant Lots 
 
(1) FE, 
OLS 
(2) FE, 
OLS 
(3) FE, 
OLS 
(4) FE, 
OLS 
(1) FE, 
OLS 
(2) FE, 
OLS 
(3) FE, 
OLS 
(4) FE, 
OLS 
(1) FE, 
OLS 
(2) FE, 
OLS 
(3) FE, 
OLS 
(4) FE, 
OLS 
I: Sales -0.269 -0.265 -0.18 -0.244 -0.062 0.04 0.163 0.133 -1.132 -1.18 -1.003 -1.03 
 [0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.020]** [0.003]*** [0.613] [0.783] [0.224] [0.348] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** 
II: 
Transactions  
-0.231 -0.211 -0.186 -0.26 0.064 0.178 0.271 0.204 -0.955 -1.061 -0.931 -1.032 
 [0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.011]** [0.000]*** [0.584] [0.160] [0.027]** [0.104] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.002]*** 3.436 
III: Prices  -0.038 -0.047 0.008 0.018 -0.15 -0.166 -0.139 -0.094 -0.177 -0.119 -0.072 0.002 
 [0.413] [0.386] [0.888] [0.739] [0.020]** [0.020]** [0.026]** [0.153] [0.153] [0.378] [0.636] [0.989] 
I - II –  III  0.000 -0.007 -0.002 0.004 0.024 0.028 0.031 0.023 0.000 0.000 0 0 
Note: The table collects the tax rate coefficients from Tables 3, 5, and A1. The last line checks whether the estimated coefficients of the transaction and 
price regressions add up to the coefficient of the sales regression.  
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To check the consistency of the transaction and price estimations, 
we also use the index of total sales on the state-year level as 
(confidentially) provided to us by GEWOS GmbH. The results, using 
the same set of models and covariates as in Tables (3) and (5), are 
found in the Appendix. The results are compatible with what can be 
expected from the previous regressions. On the one hand, for overall 
sales values of single-family houses, the tax rate coefficient is 
significantly negative and in the range of -0.2. On the other hand, the 
coefficient is insignificant (and positive) for apartments. Table 6 
reports the tax rate coefficient for the sales regression in line (I), 
together with the coefficients in the transaction and price regressions. 
It shows that the tax rate coefficients from the three sets of regressions 
are consistent, as the coefficients from the price and transaction 
regressions add up fairly well to the coefficients that derive from the 
regression of sales volumes on the tax rate. For vacant land, the 
elasticity of sales values with respect to the tax rate implies that we 
are at the top of the Laffer curve for this segment of the real estate 
market.  
 
4.2 The Tax Rate Elasticity of Revenues 
  
In a next step, we compare the above estimates of the quantity and 
price elasticities with estimates of the elasticity of the overall tax 
revenues from RETT. Unfortunately, while the tax revenue data is 
available at the state-year level, there is no separate accounting for 
the tax revenues from the different market segments. Again, we rely 
on log-log specification, as the tax revenues derive as a multiplicative 
interaction of tax base and tax rate.  
A possible expectation may be that the overall tax revenue 
elasticity should be a weighted average of the sales elasticity for 
apartments, single-family houses and vacant lots. There are several 
reasons why this may be too simplistic. First, the tax revenue 
elasticity may be different because of the existence of taxable 
nonresidential property sales.19 Another potential reason for such a 
departure is that, according to discussions with property market 
                                 
19 Based on figures of nonresidential property sales, provided by Jones Long LaSalle 
Germany, and total sales volumes, as reported by IVD Bundesverband, we find that 
nonresidential property sales should account for some 14% of total sales in 2014. 
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experts, there may be time lags between transactions and tax 
revenues.20 Finally, there could be cases in which some of the tax 
revenue is evaded, although strong safeguards are in place. Indeed, 
there is currently a vivid political debate on RETT avoidance in 
Germany.21   
Having these issues in mind, we turn to the empirical model, by 
using panel data on tax revenue,22 and tax rates to evaluate the tax 
rate elasticity of revenues. For this exercise, we utilize tax revenues 
at the state-year level, and use the respective tax rate at the state-
year level. For selected years, in which the tax rate was changed 
within a calendar year, again we use the average rate with the length 
of the respective rate applicability as the weight.   
The results are in line with some of our previous results that 
indicate behavioral effects of the RETT increases. Depending on the 
exact specification, we receive a revenue elasticity between 0.58 and 
0.72 that is significantly smaller than one.23  In the case of a constant 
tax base, a one percent increase in the tax revenue would produce a 
one percent increase in revenues. Hence, our estimates indicate that 
tax increases trigger a reduction in the tax base that must come from 
price reductions, lower transaction values, more tax evasion, or a 
mixture of these effects. 
 
                                 
20 For example, the case of a property sale to a developer who intends to resell after 
partitioning the property may lead to a deferred tax payment as, in this case, the 
tax payment may be deferred until the resale.  
21 Hessisches Finanzministerium (2016).  
22 Tax revenue data have been taken from Statistisches Bundesamt, Finanzen und 
Steuern, Fachserie 14, Reihe 4, various issues. 
23 Buettner (2017) estimates an elasticity of 0.6 in a related framework.  
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Table 7. Revenue Elasticity of the German RETT 
 
 
(1) FE, 
OLS 
(2) FE, 
OLS 
(3) FE, 
OLS 
(4) FE, 
OLS 
(5) FE, 
OLS 
(6) FE, 
Poisson 
Ln(Tax 
rate) 
0.68 0.658 0.644 0.612 0.692 0.742 
 [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** 
D(Year before -0.25  0.108 -0.509 0.321 
tax increase) [0.913]  [0.967] [0.857] [0.848] 
D(Year of tax 1.508  2.083 1.457 -1.068 
increase)  [0.635]  [0.507] [0.653] [0.658] 
D(Within year -1.516  -1.273 -1.523 1.465 
increase)  [0.523]  [0.611] [0.555] [0.481] 
Ln(GDP)   0.686 0.711 0.796 0.857 
   [0.228] [0.221] [0.103] [0.001]*** 
Ln(l.Debt)   0.049 0.051 -0.008 -0.033 
   [0.318] [0.310] [0.869] [0.347] 
Ln(Population)  1.249 1.283 0.587 0.332 
   [0.093]* [0.085]* [0.412] [0.631] 
Ln(UE)   0.194 0.202 0.12 -0.055 
      [0.296] [0.279] [0.547] [0.771] 
Observations 192 192 185 185 185 185 
State fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Density dep. 
year fixed 
effects 
Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City-state 
year fixed 
effects 
NO NO NO NO Yes Yes 
H0: Ln(Tax 
rate)  1 
0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.00*** 0.01** .-- 
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.991 0.992 0.994 -- 
States  16 16 16 16 16 16 
Note: Endogenous variable: log of yearly state RETT revenues (2003-2014). Robust p-values 
in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent confidence level. 
D(Year before tax increase) is a variable that multiplies a dummy, which equals one in state-
years that precede a tax increase in January of the next year, with the size of the tax rate 
increase. Likewise, D(Year of tax increase) is constructed for state-years with a tax increase 
in January; D(Within year increase) is positive for state-years with a tax change between 
February and November of the calendar year. Again, the dummy is scaled by the tax increase. 
Ln(GDP), l.n(l.Debt) and Ln(Population) represent the log of GDP, the log of the lagged 
debt level and the log of the population for the respective state. H0: Ln(Tax rate)  1 reports 
the confidence level at which the null can be rejected that the coefficient for Ln(Tax rate) is 
equal or larger than one. Ln(UE) is the log of the state’s officially unemployed. City state 
dependent year fixed effects in column (5) and (6) allow that more densely populated states 
have different time-fixed effects.  
  
 
The results in columns (2), and in columns (4) to (6) show 
insignificant coefficients for all three anticipation dummies and the 
comparison between (1) and (2) shows hardly any change in the 
estimated coefficient for the baseline tax effect.  
While all estimations of Table 7 allow for time-fixed effects and 
time fixed effects that are different for rural states (see Footnote 3), 
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there is the possibility that time trends for the property market are 
even more specific for city states. Therefore, the estimations in 
Column (5) and (6) introduce those time effects along with the 
previous time fixed effects. Our main coefficient of interest, Ln(Tax 
rate), is robust to this variation.  
Columns (3) to (6) add macro variables that all turn out 
insignificant except the log of GDP in the Poisson fixed effects 
estimate. All estimates report a higher reaction of the tax base than 
suggested by the sales elasticities of apartments and single-family 
houses reported in Table 6, but a lower elasticity than the sales 
elasticity of vacant lots.   
5 Conclusion  
The paper has empirically analyzed the tax effects of the German 
RETT. Our analysis has started from the observation that the 
German markets for single-family houses and apartments differ in 
their ownership patterns. While the vast majority of single-family 
houses are owner-occupied, the ownership of apartments is with 
private and incorporated investors. Conversely, owner-occupied 
apartments represent a small minority. For this reason, our empirical 
regressions have dealt with the number of transactions and the prices 
of transactions separately for these two market segments. In addition 
to this, we also take into account vacant lots as third market segment. 
Our findings suggest that, for single-family houses, the RETT leads 
to an elasticity of transactions around -0.23, but has no significant 
effect on prices of the traded houses. Conversely, for apartments, we 
could not find significant effects on transactions, but the price effect 
of the RETT tends to be negative. A stronger price effect of 
apartments may be explained by acknowledging that, for investors, 
the RETT acts like a financial transaction tax. As apartments are 
traded more frequently than single-family houses, such a financial 
transaction tax may have a larger effect for apartments.  
The fact that for apartments we find price effects but no quantity 
effects may seem surprising. However, as highlighted in Section 3, a 
price capitalization effect is theoretically possible even when holding 
periods (and therefore transactions) are constant. In the case of 
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vacant lots, which may be used for either owner-occupied, investor 
owned or business structures, we find no significant price effects, but 
severe negative quantity effects.  For this market segment, a tax 
increase may not yield revenue increases, as we are now at the top of 
the relevant Laffer curve.  
Our results for single-family houses are able to confirm previous 
results for single-family houses by O’Sullivan et al. (1995), Besley et 
al. (2014) and Fritzsche and Vandrei (2016), who have abstracted 
from the possible differences between owner-occupied housing and 
rented apartments. As in these studies, we find significant and non-
negligible tax effects on the number of transactions. This suggests 
that the German RETT may imply a possible reduction of labor 
mobility. As the RETT could lead to an inefficient use of the housing 
stock and prevent the optimal allocation of residences over households 
by hampering efficient up-sizing and down-sizing of property, i.e. 
making some large households live in too small houses and some small 
households live in too large houses, there may also be unnecessary 
mismatches between housing needs and housing characteristics 
(Sánchez and Andrews, 2011).  
Unlike evidence provided for other countries (e.g., Davidoff and 
Leigh, 2013; Kopczuk and Munroe, 2015; Ihlanfeldt and Shaugnessy, 
2004), there seems to be no price effect of the tax on single-family 
houses. Depending on the exact specification, negative price effects 
are significant in several estimations for apartments. Indeed, the 
relevant point estimates suggest that the full tax incidence is on the 
seller side.  
For single-family houses and apartments, our estimates imply that 
the elasticity of total sales with respect to the tax rate is smaller than 
the overall tax revenue elasticities. Indeed, for apartments we fail to 
identify any negative tax rate elasticity of sales. This discrepancy in 
the development of the tax revenues and the development of housing 
sales may be due to non-residential property, which is also taxed in 
Germany and may have a higher elasticity. Partly, it can also be 
explained by the high quantity effects for vacant lots, although this 
market segment seems to be relatively small compared to houses and 
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apartments.24 Another possibility may be tax avoidance effects that 
recently have received considerable attention in the political 
discussion and which may represent another margin not covered in 
this paper. The identification of these and other issues should benefit 
from availability of German micro-data on housing transactions that, 
so far, has not been made available to researchers in a comprehensive 
way.  
  
 
 
 
                                 
24 Based on information provided by IVD (a property agent union) and Jones Long 
LasSalle (a property service company), we calculate that the 2014 sales of vacant 
lots accounts for some 7.5% of non-industrial property sales.  
Table A1. Elasticity of Sales Volumes   
 
 Single-family houses Apartments Vacant lots 
 
(1) FE, 
OLS 
(2) FE, 
OLS 
(3) FE, 
OLS 
(4) FE, 
OLS 
(5) FE, 
OLS 
(6) FE, 
OLS 
(7) FE, 
OLS 
(8) FE, 
OLS 
(9) FE, 
OLS 
(10) FE, 
OLS 
(11) FE, 
OLS 
(12) FE, 
OLS 
Ln(Tax rate) -0.269 -0.265 -0.18 -0.244 -0.062 0.04 0.163 0.133 -1.132 -1.18 -1.003 -1.03 
 [0.000]*** [0.003]*** [0.020]** [0.003]*** [0.613] [0.783] [0.224] [0.348] [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.000]*** [0.001]*** 
D(Year before  2.29 3.522 2.927  4.817 7.558 8.139  3.538 5.116 0.702 
tax increase)  [0.293] [0.100] [0.238]  [0.119] [0.024]** [0.024]**  [0.621] [0.468] [0.922] 
D(Year of tax  0.614 -0.116 0.482  -4.053 -4.54 -3.103  2.284 1.552 -3.288 
increase)  [0.784] [0.953] [0.792]  [0.278] [0.157] [0.341]  [0.836] [0.886] [0.759] 
D(Within year  2.349 2.83 3.212  1.629 2.364 3.848  13.647 15.166 13.335 
increase)  [0.437] [0.322] [0.264]  [0.680] [0.480] [0.240]  [0.126] [0.086]* [0.163] 
Ln(GDP)   0.219 0.24   1.557 1.436   -2.654 -3.39 
   [0.545] [0.475]   [0.010]*** [0.004]***   [0.082]* [0.046]** 
Ln(l.Debt)   -0.038 -0.055   -0.061 -0.112   -0.209 -0.243 
   [0.434] [0.122]   [0.409] [0.012]**   [0.002]*** [0.000]*** 
Ln(Population)   1.178 1.09   1.57 0.299   -0.133 0.962 
   [0.015]** [0.022]**   [0.083]* [0.702]   [0.927] [0.553] 
Ln(UE)   0.116 0.127   0.25 -0.026   -0.056 0.459 
    [0.346] [0.370]   [0.219] [0.897]   [0.869] [0.223] 
Observations 192 192 185 185 192 192 185 185 184 184 177 177 
State fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
Density dep. 
year fixed 
effects Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes 
City-state year 
fixed effects No No No Yes No No No Yes No No No Yes 
R-squared 0.85 0.852 0.879 0.893 0.849 0.852 0.877 0.896 0.966 0.966 0.969 0.972 
States 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 16 
Note: Endogenous variable: log of sales (index), 2003-2014. Robust p-values in brackets. ***, ** and * denote significance at the 1, 5 and 10 percent 
confidence level. D(Year before tax increase) is the product of a dummy that indicates state-years that precede a tax increase in January of the next year 
and the size of the tax increase. D(Year of tax increase) marks state-years with a tax increase in January and is also scaled by the tax increase. D(Within 
year increase) is zero in state year without a tax change between February and November of the calendar year, but reflects the size of the tax increase 
otherwise. LnGDP, Ln(l.Debt), Ln(Population), and Ln(UE) represent the log of GDP, the log of the lagged debt level, the log of the population and the 
log of unemployed for the respective state. State-density dependent year fixed effects are jointly significant in all columns
 31 
References 
Amihud, Yakov and Haim Mendelson (1986), “Asset Pricing and the 
Bid-Ask Spread”, Journal of Financial Economics 17, 223-249. 
Autor, David (2003), “Outsourcing at Will: The Contribution of 
Unjust Dismissal Doctrine to the Growth of Employment 
Outsourcing” , Journal of Labor Economics 21, 1-42. 
Besley Timothy, Neil Meads and Paolo Suricoc (2014), “The Incidence 
of Transaction Taxes: Evidence From a Stamp Duty Holiday”, 
Journal of Public Economics 119, 61-70.  
Best, Michael Carlos and Henrik Jacobsen Kleven (2013), Housing 
Market Responses to Transaction Taxes: Evidence from Notches 
and Stimulus in the UK, Working Paper, London School of 
Economics.  
Burret, Heiko T., Lars P. Feld and Ekkehard A. Köhler (2017),  
“Fiscal Sustainability of the German Laender: Time Series 
Evidence”, FinanzArchiv/Public Finance Analyses 73, 103-132.  
Buettner, Thiess (2017), Welfare Cost of the Real Estate Transfer 
Tax, CESifo Working Paper 6321.  
Dachis, Ben, Gilles Duranton and Matthew A. Turner (2011), "The 
Effects of Land Transfer Taxes on Real Estate Markets: Evidence 
from a Natural Experiment in Toronto", Journal of Economic 
Geography 12, 327-354. 
Davidoff, Ian and Andrew Leigh (2013), "How Do Stamp Duties 
Affect the Housing Market?", Economic Record 89, 396-410. 
Deutsche Bundesbank (2015), Methodenbericht zu den 
Wohnimmobilienpreisindizes, Frankfurt am Main, 16. Februar 
2015, https://www.bundesbank.de/Redaktion/DE/Standard-
artikel/Statistiken/publikationen_preise.html. 
European Commission (2015), Tax Reforms in EU Member States 
2015 - Tax Policy Challenges for Economic Growth and Fiscal 
Sustainability, Institutional Paper 008, Brussels.  
Fritzsche, Carolin and Lars Vandrei (2016), The German Real Estate 
Transfer Tax: Evidence for Single-Family Home Transactions, ifo 
Working Papers No. 232.  
Ihlanfeldt, Keith R. and Thimothy M. Shaughnessy (2004), “An 
Empirical Investigation of the Effects of Impact Fees on Housing 
and Land Markets”, Regional Science and Urban Economics 34, 
639–61. 
Hessisches Finanzministerium (2016), Millionenschwere 
Steuertricksereien zügig bekämpfen, Pressemitteilung, Hessisches 
Ministerium der Finanzen, 8 September 2016.  
Hilber, Christian A.L. and Teemu Lyytikäinen (2013), Housing 
Transfer Taxes and Household Mobility: Distortion on the Housing 
or Labour Market?, Government Institute for Economic Research 
VATT Working Papers 47/2013.   
Kaas, Leo, Georgi Kocharkov, Edgar Preugschat and Nawid Siassi 
(2017), “ Low Homeownership in Germany –  A Quantitative 
Exploration” , Working Paper, University of Konstanz.  
 32 
Kopczuk, Wojciech and David Munroe (2015). "Mansion Tax: The 
Effect of Transfer Taxes on the Residential Real Estate Market", 
American Economic Journal: Economic Policy 7, 214-57. 
Matheson, Thornton (2011), Taxing Financial Transactions: Issues 
and Evidence, IMF Working Paper 54/11.   
Matheson, Thornton (2012), “Security Transaction Taxes: Issues and 
Evidence”, International Tax and Public Finance 19, 884–912.  
O’Sullivan, Arthur, Terri A. Sexton and Steven M. Sheffrin (1995), 
"Property Taxes, Mobility, and Home Ownership", Journal of 
Urban Economics 37, 107-129. 
Sánchez, Aida Caldera and Dan Andrews (2011), To Move or not to 
Move: What Drives Residential Mobility Rates in the OECD?, 
OECD Economics Department Working Papers 846, OECD 
Publishing. 
Santos Silva, J.M.C. and Silvana Tenreyro (2006), “The Log of 
Gravity”, Review of Economics and Statistics 88, 641–658. 
Slemrod, Joel, Caroline Weber, and Hui Shan (2016), The Behavioral 
Response to Housing Transfer Taxes: Evidence from a Notched 
Change in D.C. Policy, University of Michigan, SSRN-id2771229.   
Statista (2016), Wohneigentumsquote in ausgewählten Städten nach 
Eigentumswohnungen und Einfamilienhäusern im Jahr 2009. 
http://de.statista.com/statistik/daten/studie/155698/umfrage/ha
ushalte-mit-wohneigentum-nach-immobilie/ (downloaded, 13 
September 2016). 
Wooldridge, Jeffrey M. (1999), "Distribution-free Estimation of some 
Nonlinear Panel Data Models", Journal of Econometrics 90, 77-97. 
 
 
